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THE FLIP SIDE OF FETAL 
PROTECTION POLICIES: 
COMPENSATING CHILDREN 
INJURED THROUGH PARENTAL 
EXPOSURE TO REPRODUCTIVE 
HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE 
VALARIE MARK* 
INTRODUCTION 
Fetal protection policies have been used as a mechanism to 
exclude women from employment opportunities involving the 
risk of exposure to substances that are potentially harmful to 
fetuses or reproductive capacity. In March, 1991, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that such a policy, which barred all fer-
tile women from jobs entailing exposure to lead in a battery 
manufacturing plant, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act by impermissibly discriminating against women. 1 However, 
this decision did not resolve all of the problems engendered by 
reproductive hazards in the workplace. A comprehensive 
application of antidiscrimination law, occupational health law, 
and tort law is necessary to achieve a workable solution. 
Employers have offered two justifications for implementing 
fetal protection policies. The first is a general concern for the 
health of fetuses. Indeed, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Johnson Controls2 asserted that an altruistic interest in pro-
tecting fetal health played the primary role in the company's 
institution of its fetal protection policy.3 
Though laudable, this justification leads to "fetal projec-
tion." The fetus has become the locus of social concerns: 
• Associate at Crosby, Heafey, Roach, & May, in Oakland, California; J.D., 
University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1991; A.B. University of California 
at Berkeley, 1983. The author gratefully acknowledges Professor Marjorie M. Shultz 
for her insight and encouragement, and associate editors Mary-Catherine Rupp and 
Teri L. Lunn for their patience and hard work. 
1. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. 1196 (1991). 
2. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989). 
3. ld. at 884, n.25. 
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various segments of society scramble to speak for the fetus, to 
assign it rights and interests that coincide with their own, thus 
projecting their own needs onto the fetus.· The fetus is unique-
ly situated to perform this role as a symbol of social fears and 
conflicting mores in a rapidly changing society-it cannot 
speak for itself and it is poised to enter the world, soon to pos-
sess a full panoply of rights. When the fetus is assigned a 
right or an interest, it is important to examine who is assign-
ing that right, what background of beliefs or fears informs 
that assignment, and what might be gained from it. Then, we 
are able to critique the logic of the fetal rights movement and 
understand what motivates fetal protection policies.6 
The second justification for implementing fetal protection 
policies is fear of tort liability. Though courts may be reluctant 
to admit that this concern plays a role,6 the employment com-
munity reflects its alarm in recent occupational he~lth and 
management literature which focuses on the risks of dispro-
4. An employer's need to avoid potential tort liability and society's fear of social 
change regarding women's roles are disguised as the fetus' right to be born healthy. 
Fetal protection policies have arisen only in traditionally male, blue-collar jobs. In 
contrast, employers do not typically exclude women to protect fetal health in 
employment sectors traditionally dominated by women, such as secretarial work, where 
equivalent or greater risks to fetal health may be present. See Becker, From Muller 
v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, nn.I-2, 1238-39 (1986); 
Birth Defects Caused by Parental Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The 
Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237, 241 (1979) 
[hereinafter Birth Defects]. For abortion foes, the need to protect traditional notions 
of the role and status of women as childbearers and mothers may be projected onto the 
fetus and transformed into its right to life. See K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS 
OF MOTHERHOOD 192-215 (1984). 
5. See Petcheskey, Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 
(M. Stanworth ed. 1987) (discussing how images of the fetus are used as symbols in 
various political and moral debates). 
6. The 7th Circuit Court in Johnson Controls stated: "Although costs from tort 
judgments are merely a secondary consideration, they are still an important and legit-
imate additional consideration for an employer when lead safety policies may very well 
affect the development of the child in its most critical stage in the mother's womb." 
886 F.2d at 884, n.25. The court cited Wright v. Olin Corp. for the proposition that 
even though added costs standing alone might not be sufficient to support a business 
necessity defense, legitimate social concerns are. 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 
1982). The court did not define what "legitimate social concerns" might be; presum-
ably, they meant concern for the health of the fetus as opposed to the cost of com-
pensation for injury. The court must have felt constrained by the Olin language to 
justify the fetal protection policy on grounds other than fear oftort liability. 
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court denied that tort liability posed a serious 
threat, calling the possibility "remote at best." UAW v. Johnson Controls, III S. Ct. 
1196, 1208 (1991). Moreover, the Court held that the possibly increased cost of employ-
ing women is not a legitimate basis for discrimination under the bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) standard. Id. at 1209. 
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portionate damage assessments.7 On the other hand, the fem-
inist community and other legal commentators are skeptical 
about the possibility of unlimited employer liability.8 In the face 
of this controversy, the actual risk to employers must be eval-
uated: is the fear of unlimited tort liability grounded in real-
ity, or is it merely unfounded speculation? 
The issue of the injured child's possible remedies is espe-
cially important in California because of two developments. 
First, in 1990, the California Court of Appeal struck down 
Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy a year before it was 
prohibited by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that it violat-
ed the California Fair Employment and Housing Act's anti-dis-
crimination provisions. 9 Thus, until a safer workplace is 
provided, women and men will risk reproductive harm by 
working at jobs that expose them to potentially harmful levels 
of toxins. 10 
7. See, e.g., Paskal, Dilemma: Save the Fetus or Sue the Employer?, 39 LAB. L.J. 
323 (1988) (arguing that employers face the possibility of huge damage awards for 
injuries to offspring of workers); Leffert, Employers Must Consider Legal Aspects of 
Workplace Hazards, 58 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY 24 (1989) (discussing employ-
ers' options under the law in response to workplace reproductive hazards); Bond, Role 
of Corporate Policy in the Control of Reproductive Hazards of the Workplace, 28 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 193 (1986) (recommending policy statements and implementation 
strategies to address reproductive hazards); McElveen, Reproductive Hazards in the 
Workplace: Some Legal Considerations, 28 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 103 (1986) (noting 
courts' willingness to expand liability for environmental harms). 
8. See, e.g., Birth Defects, supra note 4, at 253-56 (arguing that traditional com-
mon law principles of employer liability, coupled with problems in showing causation, 
would make recovery by an injured child extremely difficult). 
9. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 
3d 517, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1990). In striking down the company's broad exclusion of 
all fertile women from jobs involving exposure to high levels oflead, the court relied 
in part on the possibility of equivalent risks to the offspring of both men and women 
from exposure to lead. Id. at 550, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 177. Since non-pregnant fertile 
women and men were in the "same position," there was no reason to exclude only 
women.Id. 
10. See Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of 
Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 
665-68 (1981); Blakeslee, Research on Birth Defects Turns to Flaws in Sperm, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 1, 1991, at 1, col. 1. 
Ideally, employers should provide (and OSHA and state health laws should 
mandate) workplaces where toxin levels are low enough to protect against reproduc-
tive and fetal harms. However, OSHA merely regulates the levels of toxins harmful 
to adults, even though fetuses and reproductive systems may be injured at consider-
ably lower levels. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 876, n.7 (7th 
Cir. 1989). It is arguable whether OSHA is required to set standards to protect repro-
ductive capacity. See Buss, Getting Beyond Discrimination: A Regulatory Solution to 
the Problem of Fetal Hazards in the Workplace, 95 YALE L.J. 577,592, n.90 (1986) (dis-
cussing the limits of OSHA in regulating reproductive toxins). 
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Second, in 1989, the California Court of Appeal addressed 
the question of remedies for a child injured by parental expo-
sure to workplace reproductive hazards. In Bell u. Macy's 
California, 11 the court held that a child's injuries "derived 
from" workplace harm to a parent are exclusively compensable 
through workers' compensation, even though the system cur-
rently provides no remedy for such injuries.12 The impact of this 
case bars a cause of action against the employer by a child 
injured in utero. 
The controversy over fetal protection policies has so far cen-
tered on the relative rights and responsibilities of the worker, 
the employer, and the state. This article examines reproduc-
tive workplace hazards from the injured child's point of view, 
advocating compensation for injuries resulting from parental 
exposure. Part I introduces four policy goals that should be 
implemented in any compensation system in order to produce 
an appropriate balance of interests. These goals are: an ade-
quate remedy for injury, equal treatment of male and female 
workers, incentives for workplace safety, and fairness to 
employers' economic interests. Part II examines current tort 
and workers' compensation law to see whether or not these 
goals are accomplished. Finally, Part III proposes a compen-
sation system which adequately serves the four policy goals. 
I. POLICY GOALS: DEFINITIONS AND JUSTIFICATION 
Any compensation system for workplace reproductive 
injuries should serve four goals: adequate remedy for injury, 
incentives to clean up the workplace, equal employment oppor-
tunity for men and women, and fairness to employers' economic 
interests. This section examines how these goals, both indi-
vidually and in concert, produce an appropriate balance of 
interests. 
A) ADEQUATE REMEDY FOR INJURY: COMPENSATION 
Compensation for injury is a traditional aim of tort law. 13 
Under the theory of "ethical compensation," justice requires 
11. 212 Cal. App. 3d 1442, 261 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1989). 
12. [d. at 1454-1455,261 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56. 
13. See Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137,151-
52 (1951); G. WILLIAMS & B.A. HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORT 28-30 (2d 
ed. 1984) (arguing that compensation for injury is the most important purpose oftort 
law); S. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION 
MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 35-49 (1989). 
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that the victim of a wrong should receive compensation.14 As 
the injured party cannot absorb the cost of crushing medical 
expenses, lost wages, etc., compensation shifts the cost of the 
accident from the individual to society at large through the 
price system or liability insurance. IS However, who should 
bear the risk? Nothing can be undertaken without risk of 
harm to others; for example, batteries cannot be manufac-
tured without risking reproductive harm to workers. The cost 
should be borne by the undertaker if the risk eventuates. IS 
In the reproductive hazards context, it is simply not fair to 
require the injured offspring to bear all of the risk. The employ-
er receives a benefit in the form of labor, the worker receives 
a benefit in the form of a job and income, and society benefits 
overall from the generated work product. Therefore, the 
employer, worker, and society should collectively bear the 
cost. Consumers can absorb some of the employer's increased 
costs (e.g., damage payments for injuries or higher insurance 
premiums) by paying a higher price for the product. Society can 
absorb some cost by paying taxes to support a compensation 
insurance system. 
In California, the injured offspring bears most or all of the 
risk. The employer bears no risk because, under Macy's, the 
employer may not be sued. 17 The female worker bears no imme-
diate risk because, under Johnson Controls, she is entitled to 
the job and cannot be the subject of discrimination. IS Because 
risk cannot be entirely eliminated, it is fair to compensate 
injured offspring for bearing the risk that benefits others. 
Compensation should include actual damages such as med-
ical costs, lost earnings, and special education expenses, i.e., 
any cost over and above what an uninjured child would incur. 
Punitive damages are not included because their function is to 
punish and deter rather than to compensate for injury.19 In con-
14. Williams, supra note 13, at 14l. 
15. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 13, at 35. Sugarman assumes most people agree that 
"when people become disabled and face unexpected income losses and medical expens-
es that leave them in financial straits, there is a collective duty to help them." Id. at 36. 
16. See Williams, supra note 13, at 151-52. 
17. 212 Cal. App. 3d 1442,261 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1989). 
18. 218 Cal. App. 3d 517; 267 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1990). However, the parent bears 
the long-range cost of caring for an injured child, and the possibility of parental tort 
liability remains. See infra pp. 701-710. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 123-26, discussing the distinction between 
punitive and compensatory damages. In the rare case of egregious employer wrong-
doing, punitive damages should be allowed through a tort suit. 
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trast, compensation for actual damages puts the child where 
she would have been economically, though unfortunately not 
physically, had there been no injury.2o 
B) INCENTIVES FOR CLEANUP: DETERRENCE 
Another basic goal of tort law is to prevent harm through 
deterrence of wrongful or negligent acts.21 Though there is dis-
agreement about whether tort law actually deters wrongful con-
duct,22 Williams suggests that tort law does deter where the 
harm is preventable; for example, civil sanctions for lack of 
workplace safety precautions may affect behavior.23 
Incentives for cleanup are important in the reproductive 
hazards area because a cleaner, safer workplace can prevent 
injuries. Surely, a healthy child is preferable because it suf-
fers less than an injured, though compensated, child. Ideally, 
the workplace should be free from all risks.24 
A safe workplace, however, cannot be achieved without 
costs. The cost of achieving a zero risk workplace may be too 
high: it may drive the employer out of business or to a foreign 
country with less strict regulations, or it may make the prod-
uct unaffordable. Thus, fairness to employers requires that 
incentives for cleanup be balanced against a tolerable level of 
risk, i.e., one that can be achieved without undue cost. If the 
cost of injury can be absorbed by the employer or an insurer and 
be eventually passed on to society without making essential 
products unaffordable, the risk level is appropriate. 
Therefore, the goal is not over-deterrence or elimination of 
all risk, but to provide incentives for cleanup to achieve a 
level of tolerable risk. 
20. Sugarman notes: "What I want, and what I assume most people want, is basic 
protection against income losses and for medical expenses that are incurred for 
whatever reason." S. SUGARMAN, supra note 13, at 48. He goes on to argue that 
although compensation for accident victims is a "proper social concern," tort law is not 
an effective means of providing it. [d. at 49. 
21. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 13, at 3-4 (first major goal of personal injury law encom-
passes behavior control, safety, deterrence of unsafe conduct and the prevention of 
injury); Williams, supra note 13, at 144-51 (explaining the deterrent function of tort law). 
22. S. SUGARMAN, supra note 13, at 3-24; Williams, supra note 13, at 149-51. 
Factors negating deterrence include the existence of insurance, the uncertainty of sanc-
tion, and lack of knowledge olthe law. [d. 
23. Williams, supra note 13, at 149. 
24. Wendy Williams argues the goal should be to make the workplace safe for all 
workers. See Williams, supra note 10, at 663-65. 
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C. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEN AND WOMEN: 
NON-DISCRIMINATION 
The "antidiscrimination principle" has been defined by 
Paul Brest as "the general principle disfavoring classifica-
tions and other decisions and practices that depend on the race 
(or ethnic origin) of the parties affected."25 This principle may 
be extended to classifications and practices based on sex as well 
as race, although the extension is problematic.26 The idea 
that classifications should be based on personal ability, rather 
than immutable characteristics such as race or sex, seems to 
be generally accepted in our society.27 
Classifications based solely on sex are disfavored in order 
to eradicate role stereotypes and vestiges of the historical 
subjugation of women. Women and men should be able to 
share equally in positions of power and decision-making in the 
larger society, as well as within family units.28 Equal access to 
employment opportunities29 is essential to this goal, not only 
because it provides personal self-fulfillment and economic 
power, but also because employment roles are often a channel 
to power in the political sphere. 
In the reproductive hazards context, one could argue that 
excluding women is justified since women are more likely 
25. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreward: In Defense of the Anti-
discrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
26. Professor Herma Hill Kay discusses the problems of applying the assimila-
tionist model of antidiscrimination, used in race discrimination cases, to sex-based clas-
sifications in Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 ILL. L. REV. 39, 78-87 (1985). The 
assimilationist model "implies that the law should treat women and men as if they were 
interchangeable." Id. at 40. Professor Kay suggests that the assimilationist model 
is inappropriate because it does not account for the fact of sexual reproductive dif-
ferences. She argues that the better approach is to "accommodate and neutralize the 
impact of those differences on the lives of women and men." Id. at 88. 
27. "Equality is a deeply-held yet elusive ideal in American legal and political 
theory." Id. at 41. 
28. Professor Kay notes that "the sex antidiscrimination cases ... display a two-
way model of access in which power is exchanged between both sex groups." Id. at 67. 
Thus, women seek to share in opportunities traditionally available only to men, 
while men seek access to spheres traditionally occupied by women. In contrast, race 
cases display "a one-way model [where] the disadvantaged racial group seeks to wrest 
power from a privileged and dominant racial group," with no reciprocal attempt by the 
dominant racial group to gain access to what the disadvantaged group has. Id. 
29. "Equality of opportunity," as opposed to assimilation, is defined by Professor 
Kay as "removing barriers which prevent individuals from performing according to their 
abilities. The notion is that the perceived inequality does not stem from innate dif-
ference in ability, but rather from a condition or circumstance that prevents certain 
uses or developments of that ability." Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of 
Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1,26 (1985). 
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than men to transmit harm to offspring. so Thus, the classifi-
cation is not so much based on sex but on the increased like-
lihood of injury. 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, the class of 
women is both overly broad and underinclusive: it includes 
infertile women who have no risk of transmitting harm and 
excludes men who may have that risk.sl Second and more 
importantly, Congress refuted the argument that pregnancy 
discrimination is not sex· discrimination32 by enacting the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.3s Congress explicitly recog-
nized that classifications based on women's reproductive capac-
ity are as impermissible as other sex-based classifications. 
The question then focuses on remedies: should pregnant women 
be treated the same as other disabled workers or is special 
accommodation of women's reproductive function permissible 
and desirable?S4 
Women's special reproductive function, including a capac-
ity to transmit harm, must be accommodated in order to put 
them on an equal footing with men in the toxic workplace.s6 
30. See supra note 10 & infra note 146, discussing the conflicting evidence 
regarding the relative capacity of women and men to transmit reproductive harm. 
31. See supra note 10 & infra note 146. 
32. The Supreme Court twice held that pregnancy discrimination was not sex dis-
crimination in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (pregnancy classifi-
cation not sex discrimination under Title VII) and in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 
(1974) (denying that exclusion of pregnancy from a disability plan's coverage was a 
sex-based classification under the equal protection clause). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). In response to the Gilbert and Geduldig deci-
sions, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) provides that the term "sex" in Title 
VII includes pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions, and that women 
affected by these conditions shall be treated the same for employment-related purposes 
as other persons similar in their ability to work. 
34. The feminist community has vigorously debated the efficacy of the question 
of "equal treatment" and "special treatment" models. See Williams, The Equality Crisis: 
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 
(1982) (arguing for equal treatment model); see generally Krieger & Cooney, The 
Miller· Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of 
Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 513 (1983). The Supreme Court 
expressed approval of the special treatment model in California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1986), holding that California's Fair Employment Law, 
requiring leave for pregnant workers but not for other similarly disabled workers, was 
not preempted by the language of the PDA providing that "women affected by preg-
nancy ... shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other per-
sons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." Guerra, 479 U.S. 
at 285 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981». The Court noted that the PDA was a floor, 
not a ceiling, on protection for pregnant women. [d. at 285. 
35. Professor Herma Hill Kay has made an impressive argument in support of 
the special treatment model for pregnancy in two articles: Models of Equality, supra 
note 26 and Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, supra note 29. In 
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Such accommodation should include paid leaves6 during preg-
nancy. Leave during the period when the woman is attempt-
ing to conceive, or while lactating, may also be necessary. The 
woman should be guaranteed her own or a substantially sim-
ilar job when she returns to work, at an equivalent rate of pay. 
The policies should be legislatively mandated if employers 
are unwilling to adopt them voluntarily. 
Leave policies comport with the basic principle of accom-
modating reproductive difference. Giv.en women's greater risk 
of transmitting harm, the policies equalize employment oppor-
tunity for women and men. Similarly, compensation policies for 
injured offspring should reduce any discriminatory impact by 
providing compensation for harm transmitted through men as 
well as women. 
D) FAIRNESS TO EMPLOYERS' ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
Fairness to employers is required for strategic reasons 
and justice considerations. Employers must be convinced that 
Models, she argues that we must find ways to accommodate and neutralize the 
impact of sexual reproductive differences of the lives of men and women. Kay, supra 
note 26, at 88. In Equality and Difference, Kay argues that accommodation of 
reproductive difference requires an "episodic analysis" that "take[s) account of 
biological reproductive sex differences and treat[s) them as legally significant only when 
they are being utilized for reproductive purposes." Kay, supra note 29, at 22. She states 
that for women, the reproductive function is manifest only during pregnancy. [d. at 
23-24. She notes that female reproductive behavior "occupies approximately nine 
months, but its cycle is complete following childbirth." [d. at 24. 
In the reproductive hazards arena, however, her analysis is faulty; workplace tox-
ins can cause harm long before a woman becomes pregnant (and perhaps after birth, 
during lactation). Thus, women may need special accommodation for a much longer 
period than just the nine months of pregnancy, including the periods when the 
woman is attempting to conceive and during lactation. 
Men also transmit pre-pregnancy harm. Kay argues that "[m)ale reproductive 
behavior is quite brief in duration." [d. Presumably her definition includes only the 
act of sexual intercourse. Yet, for men, legally significant reproductive events may 
occur constantly with exposure to workplace toxins harmful to their reproductive sys-
tems. Men are equally deserving of protection of their reproductive function; however, 
defining the relevant "episode" may be difficult, if not impossible. 
36. There is debate over voluntary versus mandatory leave and relevant time peri-
ods. See infra note 136. Voluntary leave is less paternalistic and less intrusive on 
women's autonomy; however, employees may be reluctant to request leave due to 
employer pressure. Mandatory leave is consistent with current OSHA practices 
requiring employees to temporarily leave workplaces when their own health is in dan-
ger. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k) (1990). But what level of risk triggers the leave? Must 
there be absolute proof that the substance causes reproductive harm, or is a mere sus-
picion enough? What level of scientific proof is required? Should the time of the leave 
(attempting to conceive, pregnancy, lactation) be keyed to the level of known or sus-
pected risk involved? When is leave appropriate for men, if at all? 
The answers to these questions require more technical knowledge of the effects ofvar-
ious substances than this author possesses. However, mandatory leave policies are nec-
essary to protect the reproductive function of workers endangered by workplace hazards. 
9
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any compensation mechanism is fair in order to gain support 
and compliance. Moreover, fairness is required in order to 
retain jobs. At one extreme, laws requiring unduly costly com-
pensation or insurance should not drive employers out of bus i-
ness. 37 Neither should they force employers to move their 
operations to other countries with less burdensome regulations. 
Finally, justice requires fair treatment of all actors. 
Employers benefit society by providing jobs and essential 
products. They should not be treated as wrongdoers if they are 
making good faith efforts to deal with the complex problems of 
reproductive hazards in the workplace. 
In summary, each of the four policy goals is equally impor-
tant. The first two goals express desired ends (what we want); 
the second two are operational concerns (how we want to 
achieve it). Together, they appropriately balance the inter-
ests of the three main parties: worker, child, and employer. The 
state, as guardian of these interests, should seek to devise com-
pensation solutions that implement the four principles. 
II. ARE FEARS OF MASSIVE TORT LIABILITY 
JUSTIFIED? 
The answer to this question requires an understanding of com-
mon law principles of employer liability to employees, the statu-
tory interventipn of workers' compensation laws, an in-depth 
analysis of the child's cause of action against the employer, and 
the possibility of the child's proceeding against the parent. 
A) COMMON LAW REMEDIES OF EMPLOYEE AGAINST EMPLOYER 
At common law, employers had very limited tort liability to 
employees:38 they were liable only for failure to exercise rea-
sonable care. Moreover, the employer's duties were limited to 
providing a safe workplace and safe equipment, warning 
against dangers of which the employee was reasonably igno-
37. The Supreme Court in Johnson Controls stated: ·We, of course, are not pre-
sented with, nor do we decide, a case in which costs would be so prohibitive as to threat-
en the survival of the employer's business. n UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 
1196, 1209 (1991). The court appears to suggest that such ·prohibitiven costs could 
form the basis for a BFOQ defense to a charge of discrimination., 
38. The discussion in the following three paragraphs is drawn from W.P. KEETON, 
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 
568-71 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] and 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF 
CALIFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation, § I, at 560 (9th ed. 1987) [hereinafter B. 
WITKIN]. 
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rant, providing a sufficient number of fellow workers, and 
promUlgating and enforcing safety rules. 
If one of these duties were breached, three defenses stood 
as powerful bars to employee recovery: contributory negli-
gence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant rule. 
As a result, there was no recovery for most industrial accidents. 
The assumption of the risk doctrine was particularly oner-
ous for employees. An employee who appreciated the danger 
of his workplace yet remained at work was presumed to assume 
the risk; thus, no recovery was possible, even when an employ-
er had clearly violated one of the prescribed duties. American 
courts ignored the role of economic necessity in the employee's 
"choice" to remain at work. 
In the fetal protection area, assumption of the risk might 
bar a worker's action for reproductive harms against an employ-
er who had discharged his duty to warn, if the employee under-
stood the danger.39 However, the doctrine would not bar the 
child's cause of action, since the child did not choose to be at 
a toxic worksite-the parent's implie4 waiver would not apply 
to the child. Thus, the employer could be subject to liability. 40 
B) WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 
Workers' compensation laws were enacted in response to the 
harsh treatment of employees under the rigid common law 
rules. 41 These statutes abolished the common law defenses 
and exposed the employer to absolute liability, regardless of 
negligence by either party. Workers' compensation statutes 
shift the financial burden of human accident losses in indus-
try from the employee to the employer, who can then pass 
increased costs on to the consumer.42 The advantages include 
39. Recently, courts have significantly narrowed the doctrine of assumption of 
the risk. See infra note 99. 
40. See infra pp. 693·698 and accompanying notes for additional considerations 
of employer liability. 
41. The following paragraph is drawn from PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, 
at 573-74, and B. WITKIN, supra note 38, at 560-61. 
42. Theoretically, workers' compensation could encompass injury to a child from 
parental exposure to workplace toxins. Injured offspring are human accident losses whose 
cost should be borne by industry. The employer can efficiently pass on the cost of pre-
vention and compensation to society through product price. It is difficult, however, to 
adapt the workers' compensation remedy scheme to the injured child, since benefits are 
based in part on inability to earn wages. Therefore, some form of employer-financed no-
fault compensation should be adopted to pay for the child's injury. See infra p. 710-713. 
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reduced litigation costs, immediate recovery, and promotion of 
industrial harmony. The employee need not prove proximate 
cause, but must still show that the injury was work-related.43 
Several aspects of workers' compensation law are particularly 
relevant to the reproductive hazards area.44 First, the awards 
are based on the concept of disability, which has two components: 
medical or physical disability, and inability to earn wages. 
Thus, payments to the injured worker consist only of medical 
expenses occasioned by the injury, plus wage-loss payments. 
It follows that there is no payment for emotional distress 
(except psychological care), pain and suffering, or punitive 
damages as there might be in tort. Therefore, since the costs 
of an unsafe workplace are less under a workers' compensation 
system than under a tort system, there is less incentive for the 
employer to clean up the workplace. 
Second, when an injury is "compensable," statutory benefits 
are the employee's exclusive remedy.45 The employee may not sue 
the employer in tort. The remedy is thus an imposed compromise 
whereby the worker accepts limited compensation (less than 
possible tort recovery) in exchange for assured compensation.46 
43. Not all workers are covered by workers' compensation statutes, e.g., farm 
laborers are usually exempt. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3B, at 574. This is sig-
nificant because such workers are often exposed to pesticides and other chemicals which 
can cause reproductive damage. In addition, some "casual" employees, and those 
employed' by businesses with fewer than a minimum number of employees, may not 
be covered. [d. 
44. This paragraph is drawn from 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR 
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DEATH § 57.10, at 10-1 to 10-6 (1990). 
45. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3B, at 574; see e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) 
(Deering 1991) ("Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 
concur, the right to recover such compensation is, except as specifically provided in 
this section and Sections 3706 and 455B, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employ-
ee or his or her dependents against the employer .... "). 
46. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3B, at 574. In California, there are few 
statutory exceptions to exclusivity: where the injury or death is caused by willful 
physical assault by the employer (CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(l) (Deering 1991»; where 
the injury is aggravated by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the injury and 
its connection to the employment (CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(2) (Deering 1991»; or, 
where the injury is caused by a defective product manufactured by the employer that 
the employee obtained from a third party (CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(3) (Deering 
1991». A fourth judicially-created exception is the "dual capacity" doctrine, wherein 
the employer acts as both employer and defective products manufacturer vis-a-vis the 
employee. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (Deering 1991); B. WITKIN, 8upra note 3B, § 
, 2B, at 5B1-B2, § 45, at 599-600, § 50, at 607-0B. While these exceptions may be 
relevant in individual reproductive hazards cases, the following analysis assumes that 
none apply. 
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Finally, although the injury may be clearly "compensable" 
under the statute, there may be no compensation without lost 
earning capacity.47 Nevertheless, the employee is barred by the 
exclusivity provision from suing the employer in tort.4B Thus, 
work-related injury to sexual or reproductive functions yields 
no statutory benefits to the employee, yet will not form the basis 
of a damage suit against the employer.49 
This is especially relevant in the reproductive hazards 
arena. A complete overhaul of the workers' compensation sys-
tem would be necessary to provide benefits for reproductive 
damage to the employee herself, let alone damage that may 
occur to her offspring.50 To date, no legislation has corrected 
this problem, although reform could include benefits consist-
ing of a lump sum payment regardless of wage loss, as is often 
provided for loss of a bodily member.51 
In Bell u. Macy's California, 52 a California appellate court 
recently affirmed workers' compensation as the "exclusive 
remedy" for all work-related injuries, including damage to off-
spring.53 The court's decision rested on the doctrine of "deriva-
47. See A. LARSON, supra note 44; CAL. LAB. CODE § 4660 (Deering 1991). 
48. See supra note 45. 
49. A. LARSON, supra note 44, §§ 65.20-21, at 12-4 to 12-6. In California, an 
employee was denied compensation for work-related injuries to his genitals, groin and 
thighs because there was no lost earning capacity. Williams v. State Compo Ins. 
Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975). Similarly, the workers' com-
pensation disability schedule barred his wife's suit for loss of consortium because the 
worker's benefits are in lieu of liability to any person.ld. at 123, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 816. 
The court's denial of a separate tort suit rests on the: 
. reciprocal concessions upon employer and employee alike .... 
[T]he employer assumes liability without fault, receiving 
relief from some elements of damage available at common 
law; the employee gains relatively unconditional protection 
for impairment of his earning capacity .... [T]he work-con-
nected injury engenders a single remedy against the employ-
er, exclusively cognizable by the compensation agency and not 
divisible into separate elements of damage available from 
separate tribunals .... 
ld. at 122, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (emphasis added). The court conceded that "a fail-
ure of the compensation law to include some element of damage recoverable at com-
mon law is a legislative and not a judicial problem." ld. 
50. Under current rules, the injury to the child, even if a covered type, would not 
entitle the child to benefits, as workers' compensation provides benefits only for the 
worker herself. 
51. See A. LARSON, supra note 44, § 57.11, at 10-6, § 57.14, at 10-11 to 10-16 (dis-
cussing the "schedule principle" of fixed amounts for specific physical impairments). 
52. 212 Cal. App. 3d 1442,261 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1989). 
53. rd. at 1455, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 456. In Macy's, a company medical clinic delayed 
hospitalizing a seven-month pregnant clerical employee, whose uterus had ruptured while 
she was at work. As a result of the delay, the baby suffered brain and other 
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tive injury," which applies exclusivity to a third party's claim 
for any injuries deriving from a compensable injury to an 
employee. 54 The court maintained that an employer "should 
not be held liable in tort for certain collateral consequences of 
a covered injury." 66 The Macy's holding also reflected concern 
for potential gender discrimination.58 
The outcome in Macy's was arguably unsatisfactory to both 
women and their offspring, since a child injured by workplace 
reproductive hazards is left without remedies. 57 The court 
recognized this and called upon the legislature to address the 
gap between tort and workers' compensation law.58 
physical damage, and eventually died two years later. The parents sued the employ-
er for wrongful death, for personal injuries to the employee, and for emotional distress 
to the husband. In addition, they brought a survivor's action on behalf of the child 
under the probate code. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary 
judgment based on the exclusivity provision of worker's compensation. [d. at 1446-
47,261 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50. 
54. [d. at 1452, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54. The court stated that because the baby's 
injuries "were the direct result of Macy's work-related negligence towards [the employ-
ee], they derived from that treatment and are within the conditions of compensation of 
the workers' compensation law." [d. at 1453, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 454. The court noted that 
the derivative injury rule bars a relative from recovery for mental distress resulting from 
witnessing an employee's gruesome injury or death. [d. at 1452-53, 261 Cal Rptr. at 453-
54 (citing Williams v. Schwartz, 61 Cal. App. 3d 628, 630-32, 131 Cal. Rptr. 200, 201-
02 (1976». Similarly, a spouse has no cause of action against an employer for loss of 
consortium resulting from a workplace injury. [d. (citing Williams v. State Compo Ins. 
Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812,816 (1975». 
The dissent in Macy's argued that in some instances, the employee parent would 
have received no compensable "injury" from which the child's injury could "derive." [d. 
at 1456-57, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 456-57. See also Birth Defects, supra note 4, at 239. 
However, the majority responded by noting the exclusivity provision applied not only 
to a compensable injury but also to a work-related "condition." Macy's, 212 Cal. App. 
3d at 1453 n.6, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 454 n.6. Thus, the court wrote the requirement of a 
compensable injury to the worker out of the rule. The "condition" language could apply 
to a situation where toxic exposure genetically alters a worker's sex cells. Under the 
Williams line of cases, the worker would receive no "injury," yet the child's injury would 
derive from the work-related "condition" and be exclusively compensable. 
55. Macy's, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 1454, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 455. 
56. [d. at 1454-55, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56. After acknowledging that the deriva-
tive injury doctrine "apparently has its roots in the defunct common law notion that 
a wife's right to sue for injury to her husband was derivative and collateral to the hus-
band's rights," the appellate court noted that allowing the fetus to sue its mother's 
employer would entail "serious risk" for the employer. [d. at 1453-54, 261 Cal. Rptr. 
at 454-55. The range of potential injuries to unborn children encompasses ordinary slips 
and falls, as well as more "subtle poisoning" by toxic exposure or genetic radiation dam-
age. [d. at 1454,261 Cal. Rptr. at 455. The court concluded that the employers might 
respond to potential liability by excluding women from the workplace. [d. 
57. This decision may have limited precedential value: its shaky doctrinal 
underpinnings are subject to legislative or judicial attack, the decision is binding only 
in the First District, and the California Supreme Court's denial ofreview (rev. denied 
11/15/89) does not necessarily signal approval, as the Court may be waiting for a con-
flict to develop among the Districts. 
58. [d. at 1453 n.5, 1455 n. 7, dissent at 1458,261 Cal. Rptr. at 454 n.5, 455 n. 7, 
dissent at 458. 
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In other jurisdictions, courts interpreting the exclusivity 
provision in workers' compensation statutes have reached 
contrary conclusions.69 In Adams v. Denny's Inc. ,60 the Louisiana 
Court of Appeal stated that a child's injury resulting from 
workplace reproductive hazards was not exclusively com-
pensable because the fetus was not a part of the physical 
structure of the mother's body; thus, its death was not an 
injury to the worker within the meaning of the statute.61 This 
reasoning sharply contrasts with that in Macy's, where the 
court noted that "the fetus in utero is inseparable from its 
mother. Any injury to it can only occur as a result of some con-
dition affecting its mother. "62 
Clearly, the combination of California decisions in Johnson 
Controls and Macy's calls for legislative response. The courts 
have correctly63 cut off the option of discrimination against 
59. Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distrib., 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1985) (workers' compensation exclusivity does not bar a mother's cause of action for 
emotional distress suffered as a result of fetal death caused by the employer's negli-
gence. In dicta, the court noted that workers' compensation would not bar a third party 
victim's action. 1d. at 641); Woerth v. United States, 714 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1983) (exclu-
sivity provision of the Federal Employees Compensation Act did not bar a husband's 
claim under the Federal Torts Claim Act for medical expenses and lost wages after con-
tracting hepatitis from his wife, who was covered by the FECA. The court rejected any 
application of a derivative injury rule, noting that the injuries were separate and plain-
tiff did not seek damages "with respect to" his wife's injuries. 1d. at 650); Dillon v. S.S. 
Kresge Co., 35 Mich. App. 603, 192 N.W.2d 661 (1972) (where a child's suit for 
injuries resulting from fetal exposure to rubella due to employer's negligence was 
remanded in light of recent Michigan decision allowing suits for prenatal injuries). 
60. 464 So. 2d 876 (La. Ct. App. 1985). There, an employee sued for the wrong-
ful death of her fetus resulting from a fall at work due to employer negligence. 
61. 1d. at 877. The court relied on the recent state legislative proclamation that 
human life begins at the moment of "fertilization and implantation," id., thus reach-
ing a result more favorable to the injured child than in Macy's by invoking strong pro-
life language. Another difference between the two cases is Louisiana's recognition 
of an action by parents for the wrongful death of a fetus. Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 
2d 633 (La. 1981). In California, there is no recovery for the wrongful death of a still-
born child. Justus v. Atkinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977). 
62. Bell v. Milcy's California, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1442, 1453 n.6, 261 Cal. Rptr. 447, 
454 n.6 (1989). The use of the word "inseparable" is somewhat unfortunate, since the 
meaning is ambiguous. There are three possible ways to look at the maternaVfetal rela-
tionship. First, the fetus is part of the mother's body; however, the concept of viability, 
i.e., the idea that a fetus can exist outside the womb, contradicts this notion. A more 
palatable interpretation considers the fetus and mother to have identical (insepara-
ble) interests; yet there are numerous situations where those interests might collide, 
e.g., drug abuse or abortion. Second, the fetus is entirely separate. Third, the fetus 
is separate but within the mother's body. Although the mother and fetus may have 
differing interests at times, the mother takes the interest of her fetus into account in 
her behavior. Interview with Marjorie M. Shultz, Professor of Law at University of 
California, Berkeley (Feb. 1991). 
63. These decisions were correct because they promote equal employment 
opportunity for women. See supra pp. 679-681 (discussing non-discrimination). In 
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women in Johnson Controls, but workers are still exposed to 
reproductive hazards that are potentially harmful to their 
offspring.s. Macy's leaves such injured children remediless.6s 
Since the policy reason driving the Macy's decision (the risk of 
discrimination against women) was mooted by Johnson 
Controls, the case now rests entirely on the shaky derivative 
injury rule. Therefore, Macy's should be overruled or legisla-
tively abrogated. 
Legislation to abrogate the Macy's holding was introduced 
in the California legislature in February, 1990. Assembly Bill 
No. 489 would have amended the Labor Code to add Section 
3606, reading: 
Notwithstanding Section 3602, where the 
negligence of an employer is the proximate 
cause of an injury to the unborn child of a 
pregnant employee, an action at law for 
damages may be brought against the 
employer, by or on behalf of that child, as 
provided in Section 29 of the Civil Code. 
The bill passed both houses of the legislature but was vetoed 
by Governor Wilson on October 13, 1991.6s 
This legislation was a good beginning. It allowed only a 
cause of action against the employer and not against a parent, 
although it would probably not bar such a cause of action. 67 
However, it is problematic because it deals with fetal injuries 
occurring in utero; a fortiori it only applies to women workers 
and does not cover preconception harms, such as injuries caused 
by genetic damage to either parent.68 This does not serve the basic 
addition, eliminating women from the toxic workplace is not the best nor the only way 
to prevent harm. Making the workplace safer for all workers and providing reasonable 
leave policies are feasible alternatives with a less discriminatory impact. 
64. The federal Johnson Controls decision covers discriminatory refusal to hire 
women as well as discrimination once women are working, such as firing and demo-
tion. The Court stated that "[tlhe extra cost of employing members of one sex ... does 
not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire mem-
bers of that gender.· 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209 (1991) (emphasis added). Discrimination 
in hiring, however, may be more difficult to detect and prove than other forms of dis-
crimination. 
65. Currently, an injured child's only option is to sue the parent. See infra pp. 701-
710. 
66. ASSEMBLY WEEKLY HISTORY (Feb. 6, 1992). 
67. See infra pp. 701-710 (discussing a child's cause of action against the parent). 
68. See infra pp. 690-692 (discussing preconception torts). 
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goal of equal employment opportunity for men and women. 
Also, since the legislation relies on Civil Code Section 29,69 it 
requires the child to be born alive for the cause of action to 
proceed. There would be no remedy for a stillborn child. This 
does not serve the goal of adequate remedies for all injuries. 
Legislative language should encompass the basic goals of 
equal employment opportunity, adequate compensation for 
injury, incentives for a safe workplace, and fairness to employ-
ers. Such a statute could read as follows: 
Where the negligence of an employer is the 
proximate cause of an injury to the unborn 
or unconceived offspring of an employee, an 
action at law for damages may be brought 
against the employer, by or on behalf of that 
offspring.70 
This language serves the four policy goals noted above. It 
allows the child to sue in tort, providing an incentive for 
employers to clean up the workplace. The child may sue for 
injuries incurred through both parents, reducing employers' 
incentives to discriminate. The tort remedy should be only one 
part of a broader compensation scheme to provide adequate 
compensation.71 Finally, the safeguards of the tort system, 
i.e., requiring proof of causation, lack of contributory negli-
gence, etc., should ensure fair treatment of employers. 
C) THE CHILD'S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE EMPLOYER 
As discussed above, the exclusivity doctrine in workers' com-
pensation statutes bar most suits against employers for injuries 
to employees. Most jurisdictions, however, have not established 
rules for workplace injury to unconceived or unborn offspring. 
No such suit has yet been successful, perhaps owing to 
problems in proving causation.72 However, since employers jus-
tify excluding women on the grounds of potential tort liabili-
ty, and because tort law is currently the sole means of 
69. See infra note 76. 
70. The proffered language is drawn from the defeated California Assembly 
Bill No. 489. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
71. See infra pp. 710·713. 
72. See Birth Defects, supra note 4, at 256. But see Stelly v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 20 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1040 (1990). There, the 
family of a Firestone chemical plant employee reached a settlement including $6.8 mil· 
lion for the 18·year·old son who was allegedly born mentally retarded due to the father's 
exposure to mercury on the job. 
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compensation, it is necessary to evaluate the probability of a 
child recovering for such harm. This section discusses obsta-
cles to a child's recovery in tort from an employer. For the pur-
poses of discussing California law, it is necessary to hypothesize 
that the Macy's decision has been abrogated; thus, injured 
children of workers are free to sue the employer. 
Some commentators argue that workplace exposure to haz-
ards could lead to massive employer liability to injured off-
spring.73 An action against the employer would be based upon 
negligence theory.74 The four elements ofa negligence suit are 
duty, breach, injury and causation. The obstacles an injured 
child faces in proving these elements fit under several doctri-
nallabels, as noted in the following discussion. 
1) Prenatal and Preconception Torts 
A threshold question is whether the relevant jurisdiction rec-
ognizes a cause of action for either prenatal or preconception 
injuries. This question is usually framed as whether the defen-
dant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff who was unborn or 
unconceived at the time of injury. All states now allow a cause 
of action for prenatal torts. 76 In California, such suits are specif-
ically authorized by an 1872 statute, Civil Code Section 29. 76 
73. See Paskal, supra note 7, passim. It is important to note that Paskal's 
analysis uses cases from various jurisdictions to prove his thesis. However, tort law 
is state law; thus, any accurate analysis needs to be jurisdiction-specific. 
74. The employer is "strictly liable" to its employees in only two situations: 
first, an employer who also acts in the role of manufacturer can be strictly liable for 
providinJf defective products; or second, where the employer's activity is unusually dan-
gerous and is carried on in an inappropriate location. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra 
note 38, § 75 at 537-38 (discussing unusually dangerous activities); 6 B. WITKIN, 
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, § 1241-43, at 675-79 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing 
strict products liability). Though some manufacturing activities and substances could 
be considered dangerous, it would be difficult to argue that the manufacturing plant 
was an inappropriate location for their use. 
75. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946) was the first American case to 
recognize a cause of action for prenatal torts. Since then, all jurisdictions have followed 
suit, at least for children born alive. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 55 at 368. 
The duty and cause of action are recognized in California. 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF 
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, § 636 at 728. 
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (Deering 1990) states: 
A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing 
person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the 
event of its subsequent birth; but any action by or on behalf 
of a minor for personal injuries sustained prior to or in the 
course of his birth must be brought within six years from the 
date of birth of the minor .... 
Prior to 1946, the statute was used primarily to protect the rights of future 
beneficiaries under wills, trusts, and life insurance policies, etc. The statute is 
problematic in several respects. First, it explicitly states a fetus is a "person," thus 
fueling the abortion debate. However, courts have interpreted the statute to mean that 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/4
1992] FLIPSIDE OF FETAL PROTECTION 691 
As of early 1991, only a few courts had expressly ruled on 
the question of preconception torts. Of these, all jurisdictions 
except New York recognized the preconception cause of action.77 
The California Supreme Court has acknowledged the tort in 
dicta. 78 Recently, a California Court of Appeal expressly rec-
ognized the preconception cause of action but limited its appli-
cation to product manufacturers and medical care providers. 79 
a fetus is a person only for some purposes. See, e.g., Endo Labs., Inc. v. The Hartford 
Ins. Group, 747 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1984) (fetus later born alive is a person for purposes 
of liability under insurance policy); Reyna v. City & County of San Francisco, 69 Cal. 
App. 3d 876,138 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1977) (fetus is not a person for purposes of wrongful 
death statute). But see Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939) 
(statute based on recognized fact that viable fetus is a "human being," separate and dis-
tinct from the mother, allowing child to maintain malpractice suit against physician for 
injuries sustained incident to delivery). Secondly, a child must be "conceived" at the time 
of injury for a cause of action to proceed; thus, the statute does not authorize precon-
ception torts. The California Supreme Court resolved this, however, in Turpin v. 
Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). The six-year statute 
oflimitations is tolled by the delayed discovery rule. Call v. Kezirian, 135 Cal. App. 3d 
189, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982); Segura v. Brundage, 91 Cal. App. 3d 19, 153 Cal. Rptr. 
777 (1979). 
77. See, e.g., Monusko v. Postle, 175 Mich. App. 269, 437 N.W.2d 367 (1989) (pre-
conception negligence cause of action exists against physician for failure to test moth-
er for rubella); Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 28 (8th Cir. 1978) (allowing cause 
of action under Missouri law to a child born alive for preconception injuries due to neg-
ligent Caesarian section on the mother in a prior pregnancy); Renslow v. Mennonite 
Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (allowing cause of action for injuries to child 
sustained through negligent transfusion of mother with incompatible blood before con-
ception); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (allow-
ing cause of action under Oklahoma law for claim that use of defendant's oral 
contraceptive altered the mother's chromosomal structure to produce deformed children). 
These courts have based their conclusions on basic concepts of duty and proximate 
cause. The Renslow court summed up its logic by stating: "We believe that there is a 
right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the 
child's mother." 67 Ill. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. In contrast, New York courts have 
disallowed most preconception torts for various policy reasons: the need to limit liability, 
to prevent frivolous claims, and to avoid incongruity with statutes oflimitations. Some 
courts claim no duty to the unconceived because there is no duty to protect the poten-
tiality of life. Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 130 Misc. 2d 872, 498 N.Y.S.2d 
703 (1986) (no cause of action for preconception strict products liability). See also 
Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377,570 N.E.2d 198 (1991) (no strict liability cause 
of action for injuries to grandchild resulting from grandmother's use of DES); Albala v. 
City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981) (no cause of 
action in New York for preconception negligence). 
78. In Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220,230-31,643 P.2d 954,960,182 Cal. Rptr. 
337, 343 (1982), the Court stated: "[Ilf (plaintiffs) deafness ... resulted from a tort com-
mitted upon her mother before conception (citations omitted), it is clear that she would 
be entitled to recover against the negligent party." 
79. In Hegyes v. Unjian Enter., Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1991), 
the court held that an automobile driver owes no duty of care to the unconceived child 
of a woman injured by his negligent driving, since the subsequent injury to the child is 
not reasonably foreseeable. Under this reasoning, employers could be liable to uncon-
ceived children of workers if the injury is foreseeable. See id. at 1130-33, 286 Cal. 
Rptr. at 101-03. However, the court also held that no defendant except a product man-
ufacturer or medical professional owes a duty of care to the unconceived. [d. at 1113, 
286 Cal. Rptr. at 89. Though the court did not discuss employers as potential defendants, 
its subsidiary holding may become another barrier to recovery against them in California. 
19
Mark: Flip Side of Fetal Protection Policies
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
692 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:673 
In a jurisdiction which does not recognize preconception 
torts, a child could not sue an employer for workplace harms 
mediated through the father, as all harm would necessarily 
occur prior to conception.so This creates an incentive for employ-
ers to exclude women from the workplace. In the future, courts 
should keep this outcome in mind when deciding whether to 
allow preconception torts. 
2) Causation 
Proving causation is the second substantial obstacle to an 
injured child's recovery. A plaintiff in a negligence suit must prove 
both cause in fact (actual cause) and proximate (legal) cause. 
To prove actual cause, the child must show that workplace 
exposure actually caused the harm. This is difficult in the 
reproductive hazards context; there is a general lack of scien-
tific knowledge, and toxic exposure has a delayed impact.81 The 
available data consist of animal experiments and epidemio-
logical studies showing the likelihood of a substance to cause 
harm.82 Mass tort cases have similar causation problems.8s 
The question of proximate or legal cause involves deter-
mining whether it is just to hold the defendant responsible in 
the particular situation.84 Factors to consider include foresee-
ability of consequences, concurrent causes, intervening caus-
es, and whether employers may shift the duty to protect to 
someone else.85 
All of these factors are relevant in the reproductive hazards 
arena. Regarding foreseeability, the employer must or should 
know the risk of reproductive harm. Other concurrent 
causes of birth defects must be ruled out. The decision of the 
80. One possible exception could be where toxic substances on a man's clothing 
are transmitted through a pregnant woman to the fetus. This situation should be ana-
lyzed as a prenatal tort, with the employer a few steps removed from the fetus. A relat-
ed problem, where a young child encounters toxins through exposure to a parent's 
clothing, see N.Y. Times, supra note 10, is beyond the scope of this paper, as it is not 
a reproductive harm but a direct injury to the child. 
81. Birth Defects, supra note 4, at 242. 
82. Paskal, supra note 7, at 333. Paskal notes the sympathy of courts to victims, and 
fears that courts will apply a presumption of causation in fetal torts litigation. [d. at 335. 
83. See S. SUGARMAN, supra note 13, at 41-49 (discussing how causation problems, 
among others, hindered accomplishment of the compensation goal in Agent Orange, 
bendectin, asbestos, and IUD litigation). 
84. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 42, at 272-80; 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY 
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, §§ 965-72, at 354-63 (9th ed. 1988). 
85. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 42, at 279. 
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parent, duly warned, to work in the face of known danger 
might be considered an intervening cause.88 If the state regu-
lates workplace toxins, the employer's compliance with such 
regulations may shift any duty to protect to the state.87 
Ultimately, if a court decides that the connection between the 
employer and the injury is too tenuous, or if there is a policy 
basis that justifies exonerating the employer, proximate cause 
could be the legal label which releases the employer from lia-
bility. 
3) Common Law Duties and Defenses 
Common law rules regarding employer liability to employ-
ees apply when an injury is not compensable through workers' 
compensation.88 Then, the employer is subject to the common 
law duties and defenses. 
a) Duty to Provide a Safe Workplace-Compliance With 
Applicable Regulations 
The employer's duty to provide a safe workplace and safe 
equipment is implicated in the reproductive hazards context. 
Compliance with applicable safety statutes and regulations 
may discharge this duty. In California, violation of a statute 
or regulation will be considered negligence per se where the vio-
lation proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.89 Thus, a 
finding that an employer violated safety regulations would 
contribute to a finding of negligence. An employer's compliance 
with applicable regulations would not necessarily bar suit ifit 
were found that the employer should have exercised a higher 
standard of care than the regulations required.90 However, in 
the trier of fact's eyes, evidence of compliance would likely 
weigh heavily in the employer's favor. 
Currently, applicable federal occupational health regula-
tions (OSHA standards) do not take reproductive harms into 
86. See infra pp. 695-697 (discussing parental consent as barrier to liability). 
87. But see infra pp. 693-694 (discussing compliance with applicable regulations). 
88. See supra pp. 682-683 (discussing common law rules). 
89. 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts, §§ 818-21, at 170-175 (9th 
ed. 1988). This general principle does not appear to have been tested in the repro-
ductive hazards arena. Compare Security Nat'l Bank v. Chloride, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 
294 (Kan. 1985) (violation of OSHA lead standard not necessarily negligence per se 
under Kansas law). 
90. See National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671,680 n.9 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (compliance with OSHA standards not a defense to tort or criminal liability). 
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account. The standards are set at levels which will not harm 
adults,91 even though fetuses and reproductive systems can be 
damaged at lower levels. Because current regulations do not 
protect offspring, compliance with such regulations should 
not bar suit by an injured child against the employer. 
Ajudge or jury should hold the employer to the standard of 
keeping the workplace safe enough to protect offspring as well 
as adults. '!\vo reasons justify holding the employer to the high-
er standard: first, it will encourage the employer to develop 
technology to make a safer workplace; second, even if the 
employer's behavior does not change, the injury should be 
compensated.92 
b) Employer's Knowledge of Risks 
Where an employer does not know of the risk of harm and 
has no reason to know, there is no liability. However, where the 
employer does not know about the risk of harm, but should 
know, liability may follow. 
The employer93 should not be held to a standard of knowing 
every risk of harm in the workplace.9• Rather, she should be 
held to know the general health risks that the workplace pre-
sents to employees. The standard should equal that knowledge 
generally available in the relevant business and scientific 
community.96 The employer should have a duty to investigate 
additional risks if his process or materials are unique.96 
Likewise, the employer should not be held to know whether 
individual workers are pregnant or planning to conceive. The 
91. See supra note 10. 
92. See supra pp. 676·678. For a discussion of the split between the regulatory 
and compensatory aspects of damages, see infra pp. 700·701. 
93. The employer may often be a corporation or other business enterprise. In this 
context, "the employer" is the individuals comprising the organization. Knowledge of 
agents of the organization (management level employees) should be imputed to the 
organization itself under principles of agency law and respondeat superior liability. 
94. "Knowledge" has been defined as "the belief in the existence of a fact, which 
coincides with the truth ... the actor must give to his surroundings the attention which 
a standard reasonable person would consider necessary under the circumstances, and 
... must use such senses as he has to discover what is readily apparent." PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 38, § 32, at 182. 
95. Persons with knowledge above that of the ordinary person, such as profes· 
sionals, will be held to that standard of knowledge. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
38, § 32, at 185. 
96. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 32, at 185 (regarding the duty to 
investigate in special relationships). 
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employer must warn all workers, regardless of particular risk, 
to avoid discrimination and to maximize employee protection. 
c) Employer's Duty to Warn-Parental Consent as Barrier to 
Liability 
The employer's duty to warn employees of dangerous work-
place conditions97 is somewhat analogous to a physician's duty 
to provide informed consent to a patient. Where the physician 
discharges the duty, and the patient chooses or refuses treat-
ment, the physician is not liable for the consequences of that 
decision.98 In the employment context, if the employer violates 
her duty and does not warn, liability to the child is more like-
ly. However, where the employer discharges the duty through 
appropriate warnings and the employee/parent nevertheless 
chooses to work, that consent may cut off the employer's lia-
bility to the child. 
In the case of injury to a fully informed employee who choos-
es to work, the doctrine of "assumption of the risk" might preclude 
liability.99 Although the employee cannot waive the child's right 
to sue, parental consent might cut off the employer's liability. 100 
97. In addition to the common law duty to warn, the employer must also comply 
with applicable federal and local occupational health law warning requirements, 
such as those prescribed by OSHA, CAL OSHA, and Prop. 65. 
98. For a discussion of informed consent law in California, see 5 B. WITKIN, 
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, §§ 352-62, lit 439-49 (9th ed. 1988). Consent of 
parent or guardian is ordinarily necessary to authorize an operation on a child. [d. 
§ 353 at 440. 
99. The doctrine of "assumption of the risk" has undergone much change recent-
ly. As of early 1991, the employee was required to know the particular risk was pre-
sent and must have understood its nature. Moreover, she was required to assume the 
risk voluntarily. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 68, at 486-92. In the workplace 
reproductive hazards context, the first requirement would be met if the employer dis-
charged his duty to warn and the employee understood. Under the second requirement, 
however, the worker's consent might be considered involuntary due to economic 
pressure or employer coercion. 
Many courts have abolished "assumption of th.e risk" entirely in the employ-
er/employee context. In other jurisdictions, the defense has been merged into the com- . 
parative negligence doctrine. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 68, at 491-98. 
California falls partially into the latter category. "Unreasonable" assumption of the 
risk is incorporated into comparative negligence, but "reasonable" assumption has sur-
vived it. "Reasonable" assumption has been applied in the employment context, 
where employees such as firefighters and stuntpeople are held to "reasonably" assume 
the risk of their occupations if they know of the particular risk. 6 B. WITKIN, supra note 
38, Torts, §§ 1089-90, at 492-94. It is unclear whether manufacturing workers exposed 
to toxins would fall into the "reasonable" category. 
100. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986); United States v. 
University Hosp. of State Univ. of N.Y. at Stonybrook, 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983), affd 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 
561 F. Supp. 395 (D.C. 1983). 
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Support for this proposition can be found in the "Baby 
Doe" cases. 101 There, the U.S. Supreme Court and other Federal 
Courts struck down regulations of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services which would have required hos-
pitals to provide treatment to handicapped infants, even where 
the parents did not consent to such treatment. The cases may 
stand for the idea that a parent's choice to deny consent cuts 
off the hospital's liability; thus, the hospital had no duty to treat 
where the parent had not consented. 
Similarly, in the employment context, where a parent affir-
matively chooses to work in a hazardous workplace, implied-
ly consenting to the exposure of her reproductive system to 
hazards, the employer may have no duty to protect the employ-
ee's offspring from harm. 
However, the two situations are not exactly analogous. 
First, the regulations at issue in the Baby Doe cases were 
promulgated pursuant to antidiscrimination statutes. The 
purpose of the statutes was to ensure that disabled infants were 
treated the same as other infants.lo2 The regulations were held 
invalid because the hospitals had not discriminated against 
disabled infants in refusing to provide unauthorized care. loa If 
the statutes had been intended to save disal?led babies, the 
cases might have been decided differently. In the reproductive 
hazards context, then, parental consent might not cut off 
employer liability if the purpose of recognizing liability is to pro-
tect the health of the employee's offspring. 
Second, courts might find that employers still have a duty 
to protect an employee's offspring from workplace hazards if 
they feel that it is reasonable. In the "Baby Doe" cases, doctors 
sided with parents in determining that the best treatment 
was to allow the severely handicapped infants to die. 104 The rule 
disallowing liability due to lack of parental consent was 
101. See supra note 100. 
102. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986), citing 29 U.S.C. § 794 
(1983). 
103. United States v. University Hosp. of State Univ. of N.Y. at Stonybrook, 575 
F. Supp. 607, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd 729 F.2d 144, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1984); Bowen 
v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 630-33 (1986). 
104. In United States v. University Hosp. of State Univ. of N.Y. at Stonybrook, 
575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), the parents 
refused treatment after consulting several physicians. The Appellate Division con-
cluded that the parents' decision was reasonable, based on responsible medical 
authority. 729 F.2d at 146-47. 
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arguably justified by medical expertise. In contrast, where 
medical testimony favors an employer duty and subsequent lia-
bility, such a duty might be found. 
Finally, policy considerations may favor employer liability 
when parental choice, though informed, was nevertheless not 
entirely voluntary. The employee and employer are not in 
equal bargaining positions. The employer is usually superior 
in both power and knowledge, especially in large manufacturing 
operations. The employer is in a position to coerce the employ-
ee to remain in the workplace through express or implied 
threats; after all, the employer has a stake in keeping employ-
ees in whom he has invested money to recruit, hire and train. 105 
Moreover, economic duress may affect the employee's choice if 
she feels she must work to provide income and health benefits 
to herself and her family. Policy considerations of this sort may 
justify employer liability even where the worker purportedly 
"consented. " 
Whether parental choice would cut off the employer's lia-
bility can also be analyzed under "intervening cause" doc-
trine. A parent's negligent supervision of a child can insulate 
a defective product manufacturer from liability for the child's 
injuries. lo6 In more general terms, where a third person (par-
ent) is notified of the danger in advance, but chooses to 
disregard the notice and inflicts the danger on plaintiff (child), 
the responsibility shifts to the parent. 107 
4) Vicarious Liability 
An employer could possibly be vicariously liable for the neg-
ligence of the employee in choosing to work in a hazardous 
workplace. The California Court of Appeal has held, however, 
that there was no vicarious liability on an employer's part 
105. This situation is most likely in jobs requiring a high degree of skill with sub-
stantial training costs, or where workers are not protected by a union or other labor 
organization and are thus more vulnerable to employer coercion. 
106. The discussion of intervening cause is drawn from PROSSER & KEETON, 
supra note 38, § 44, at 318·19. 
107. In cases of extreme danger or certain special relationships, public policy may 
require that responsibility remain with the defendant even in the face of third party 
intervention. Such a special relationship was found between a rental car company and 
driver ofa defective rental car in Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5,9,265 N.W. 829, 831 
(1936). This public policy exception could conceivably apply to the special relation· 
ship between employer and employee. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, § 44, at 
318·19 (discussing the public policy exception). 
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where an employee's negligence was the sole cause of his 
child's death. lOS In another case, the court denied an action 
against the employer under respondeat superior for the tort of 
the employee/parent within the scope of employment. The 
court reasoned that the employer would have an indemnity 
right against the negligent employee/parent, allowing the 
child to sue the parent indirectly. 109 
5) Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson ControlsllO 
raises the question whether compliance with Title VII would 
preempt a child's cause of action against the employer.lll 
Preemption questions arise when state law conflicts with 
federal law; the state law may be held invalid under the 
supremacy clause of the Constitution.112 
State laws may be preempted in several ways.1l3 First, 
Congress may expressly state that federal law preempts state 
law. Absent such express language, preemption may be implied 
by either Congress' intention to occupy a field or where federal 
108. Premo v. Grigg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 192,46 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1965). 
109. Myers v. Tranquility Irrigation Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 389-90 (1938). As 
this case was decided before the abrogation of parental immunity, the outcome might 
be different because children are now able to sue their parents in tort. See infra 
pp. 701-710. 
110. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). 
111. The majority held that Johnson Control's fetal protection policy violated Title 
VII and the company failed to establish a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), 
the only defense available to a facially discriminatory policy. [d. at 1207. The major-
ity construed the BFOQ narrowly to include only "job-related skills and aptitudes ... 
qualifications that affect an employee's ability to do the job." [d. at 1204-05. Noting 
that the preemption issue was not before the Court, the majority minimized the pos-
sibility of employer liability by arguing that compliance with Title VII might preempt 
the child's cause of action. [d. at 1208-09. In contrast, the concurrence argued that 
the BFOQ is broad enough to encompass concerns about increased costs in hiring 
women due to the possibility of substantial tort liability, id. at 1210-14, intimating that 
compliance with Title VII would probably not preclude that liability. [d. at 1211. 
Neither the majority nor the concurring opinions analyzed the preemption issue in 
depth. 
112. Whether federal law preempts state law is largely a matter of federal 
statutory construction. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-25, at 480 (2d Ed. 
1988). See also California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 
(1986) ("In determining whether a state statute is preempted by federallaw ... our sole 
task is to ascertain the intent of Congress."). Courts are traditionally reluctant to find 
preemption in ambiguous cases. L. TRIBE, supra, at 479. See also Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986) (overriding presumption that Congress 
did not intend to displace state law). 
113. The following paragraph summarizing preemption law is drawn from 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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law actually conflicts with state law, i.e., it is physically impos-
sible to comply with both laws or state law frustrates the pur-
poses of the federal law. 
Title VII does not have express preemption language; in 
fact, it contains an express anti-preemption provision. 114 Read 
literally, Title VII would preempt only those state laws that 
require or permit employers to exclude women from jobs in toxic 
workplaces. Thus, an action based on the claim that an employ-
er violated a duty to refuse to hire (or to exclude) an employ-
ee from a toxic workplace would be preempted.116 
It would be difficult to establish implied preemption by Title 
VII in the reproductive hazards arena. In order to determine 
that Congress intended to occupy a field, there must be evi-
dence of intent to exert exclusive control.116 The scheme must 
be so pervasive or the federal interest so dominant as to eradi-
cate state claims. 117 Here, Congress clearly did not intend to occu-
py the entire field of reproductive hazards through the mechanism 
of Title VII, as Title VII does not regulate workplace safety. 118 
Implied preemption by actual conflict could be implicated 
in the reproductive hazards arena. In determining actual con-
flict between state and federal law, the court examines the pur-
poses of the federal law and how state law will affect those 
purposes.1I9 Here, the purpose of Title VII is to remove 
114. Sec. 2000e-7 of Title VII reads: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or 
relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or pun-
ishment provided by any present or future law of any State 
or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law 
which purports to require or permit the doing of any act 
which would be an unlawful employment practice under 
this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1981). 
115. Notwithstanding Title VII's mandate against discrimination, however, the 
other elements of the employer's duty to employees remain intact. Therefore, a tort 
claim based on employer negligence in providing a safe workplace would not be 
expressly preempted by compliance with Title VII. See also Bernstein v. Aetna Life 
& Casualty, 843 F.2d 359, 365 (9th Cir. 1988) ("It is well established that Title VII does 
not preempt state common law remedies.") 
116. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 1986). 
117. [d. When purely private rights of action are at issue, determining the 
scope of an occupied field requires a restrained view. [d. 
118. Whether compliance with both Title VII and OSHA would preclude a state 
tort claim is uncertain. Normally, compliance with OSHA will not preempt state 
tort liability. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 680 n.9 (7th 
Cir. 1990). The OSH Act contains a broad savings clause similar to the one in Title 
VII. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1988). 
119. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,187 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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discrimination in the workplace. 120 Allowing state tort claims 
would not make it physically impossible for the employer to 
comply with both state and federallaw. 121 Moreover, state tort 
laws allowing injured children to recover would not hinder Title 
VII's purpose. The Supreme Court has decided that employ-
ers may not discriminate against women who choose to work 
in potentially hazardous jobs and any extra cost of employing 
women is not an excuse for discrimination. 122 
In the preemption area, there is a split of authority regard-
ing the effect of state law tort actions. Some courts have dis-
tinguished between the compensatory and regulatory aspects 
of damages, 123 reasoning that it is not inconsistent to allow tort 
recovery because a damage award does not require a defen-
dant to alter behavior,124 only to pay for resulting injury. On the 
other hand, the court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 126 reject-
ed this approach, refusing to separate regulatory from com-
pensatory aspects of a damages award. 126 Certiorari has been 
granted in a related case to resolve this conflict in the approach 
to preemption. 127 
120. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). 
121. The employer can obey Congressional mandate by employing women in haz-
ardousjobs, while compensating for resulting injuries. See Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 139, 141-43 (1963) (no preemption where no impos-
sibility of dual compliance). 
122. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. 1196 (1991). Nonetheless, the Court 
seemed concerned about this issue: MIfstate tort law furthers discrimination in the work-
place and prevents employers from hiring women who are capable of manufacturing the 
product as efficiently as men, then it will impede the accomplishment of Congress' goals 
in enacting Title VII." 1d. at 1209. In light of the Court's holding, however, employers 
may not exclude women to protect fetal health. State tort law cannot Mprevent" employ-
ers from hiring women without the employer violating Title VII. 
123. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr McGee, 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (compensatory and 
punitive damages for injuries suffered from radiation contamination not in conflict with 
exclusive federal safety regulation. 1d. at 256. The dissent emphasized that punitive 
damages regulate safety by punishing and deterring, while compensatory damages com-
pensate. The absence of a federal compensation scheme bolsters the contention that 
. Congress intended to leave state compensation mechanisms intact. 1d. at 260-64); 
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. 1984) (no preemption oftort rem-
edy absent a clear and manifest Congressional purpose to do so. 1d. at 1542-43). 
124. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541-42. 
125. 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986) (federal cigarette labeling law preempts state 
law damage claims challenging the adequacy of warnings, advertising and promotion 
regulations). 
126. 1d. at 187. The court found that the duties imposed by the state law effec-
tively imposed a requirement to label cigarettes differently, which conflicted with the 
preemption provision ofthe Act. 1d. at 187. 
127. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 
111 S. Ct. 1386 (Mar. 25,1991) (No. 90-1038). 
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Whichever rationale the Supreme Court adopts, a child's 
cause of action against an employer should not be preempted by 
compliance with Title VII. First, employers are able to comply 
with both Title VII and state tort law by compensating injured 
offspring. l28 Tort liability would be an added incentive to change 
negligent behavior, an effect that is consistent with the purposes 
of both Title VII and OSHA. Second, since neither federal law 
provides a compensation scheme for injured offspring, it is 
reasonable to infer that Congress intended state tort compen-
satory mechanisms to apply. Finally, compliance with Title VII 
would have no effect on compensating injuries mediated through 
paternal exposure. It would be inconsistent and discriminato-
ry to forestall compensating children injured through maternal 
exposure because employers have complied with Title VII's 
mandate not to exclude women. 
6) Summary: Liability "Remote" 
Fear of unlimited tort liability is unfounded, as there will 
be many barriers to finding an employer liable to a child 
injured through workplace reproductive hazards. Liability 
mechanisms under tort law will protect employers from unlim-
ited responsibility. Nonetheless, when employers are negligent, 
causes of action by injured offspring should be allowed in 
order to provide one form of necessary compensation. 129 
D. THE CHILD'S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PARENT 
If parental choice to continue work in a known hazardous 
workplace cuts off employer liability to the child, the parent 
128. At a minimum, traditional compensatory damages, including medical 
costs, lost wages, and special education expenses should be available to an injured 
child. 
129. The Supreme Court concluded in Johnson Controls: 
Without negligence, it would be difficult for a court to find lia-
bility on the part of the employer. If, under general tort prin-
ciples, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal protection policies, the 
employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the 
employer has not acted negligently, the basis for holding an 
employer liable seems remote at best. 
111 S. Ct. 1196, 1208 (1991). Where an employer makes a good faith effort to protect 
employees and their offspring by investigating and knowing the risks, complying with 
applicable regulations, and adequately warning employees of those risks, then the 
employer should not be held liable for resulting harm. The injured child is uncom-
pensated, however, which points out the main difficulty of the tort system: compen-
sation depends on a finding of fault. See S. SUGARMAN, supra note 13, at 36-37. A 
no-fault compensation scheme, as described in Part III of this article, would remedy 
this inequity. See infra pp. 710-713. 
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could be held accountable. 130 Current law may allow a child's 
cause of action against the parent for negligent reproductive 
exposure to workplace hazards; whether one should be allowed 
is problematic. This section examines the implications of allow-
ing such a suit and the probability of its success. 
1) Parental Immunity and the "Reasonableness» Standard 
A threshold question is whether there is parental immunity 
from tort liability in the relevant jurisdiction. lSI In California, 
the state Supreme Court abrogated the parental immunity 
doctrine in Gibson u. Gibson, 132 finding that the policy bases no 
longer justified the rule.133 The court rejected a blanket exception 
to liability where parents would have immunity if the alleged 
130. Lending credence to this proposition, the Supreme Court stated in unusu-
ally strong language: "Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to 
the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employ-
ers who hire those parents." UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. 1196, 1207 
(1991). The Court continued, "It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for 
individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more impor-
tant to herself and her family than her economic role. Congress has left this choice to 
the woman as hers to make." Id. at 1210. 
If women have the complete prerogative to make such decisions, the Court 
implies that she should bear liability for that choice. However, the Court failed to rec-
ognize the role of federal and state regulations which could mandate removal or 
leave mechanisms to protect reproductive and fetal health. Compliance with such pro-
visions could preclude liability, except where voluntary leave was not taken. See infra 
note 136. 
131. For an historical overview of the parental immunity doctrine and its abro-
gation, see Santello, Maternal Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 
747,757-62 (1988). 
132J. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648,92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). 
133. Id. at 919-920, 479 P.2d at 651-52, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92. The doctrine rest-
ed on the possibility of disruption offamily harmony, fraud or collusion between fam-
ily adversaries, as well as a threat to parental authority and discipline. 5 B. WITKIN, 
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts, §§ 30-31, at 90-93. The Gibson court reasoned that 
the presence of insurance alleviated intra-family discord. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 
914,922,479 P.2d 648,653,92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293. Renter's or homeowner's policies 
often include a personal liability policy that could presumably cover the fetal or pre-
conception injury. Actual coverage would depend on the language of the individual 
policy and local law. 
In the workplace reproductive arena, this rationale may be questionable. Some 
insurance policies exclude coverage for members of the insured's family. See 
Annotation, Validity, Under Insurance Statutes, Of Coverage Exclusion For Injury To 
Or Death Of Insured's Family Or Household Members, 52 A.L.R.4TH 18 (1987) (describ-
ing auto insurance policies). Although insurance policies may cover conceived yet 
unborn persons, unconceived persons may be excluded even though the injuring 
harm was damage to a reproductive system. See Annotation, Unborn Child as Insured 
or Injured Person Within Meaning of Insurance Policy, 15 A.L.R.4TH 548 (1982). 
Most courts require the child to be born alive for coverage to apply. Others impose an 
additional requirement of viability. Id. 
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negligent act involved an exercise of parental authority or ordi-
nary parental discretion in providing care. 134 Instead, the court 
adopted a standard for parental negligence based on reason-
ableness "viewed in light of the parental role. [T]he proper test 
of a parent's conduct is this: what would an ordinarily reason-
able and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?"136 
Regarding reproductive hazards, the issue of liability would 
turn on whether a parent's choice to work in a hazardous 
workplace was reasonable in light of the circumstances. The 
standard allows the court flexibility in balancing factors that 
influence the parent's decision to work against the impact on 
the family from a decision not to work, such as loss of wages and 
health care benefits. A court might conclude that the parent's 
choice was reasonable where the risks to reproductive health 
were minimal or indeterminable, compared to the immediate 
detriment to the family. Any judgment of reasonableness would 
include an assessment of available alternatives. 136 
California had allowed two major exceptions to parental immunity: if the child were 
emancipated or if the parental act was willful or malicious. 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF 
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, § 30, at 90-91. Elsewhere, the doctrine is subject to numerous 
exceptions; somejurisdictions allow suits where the iI\iury occurred due to parental neg-
ligence while engaged in a vocational, business or employment activity not connected 
with parental duties. See Annotation, Liability of Parent For Injury to Unemancipated 
Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4TH 1066, 1102-07 (1981). 
This "business capacity" exception could arguably allow a tort suit against a parent for 
the decision to work in a hazardous workplace, although the exception could be limit-
ed to decisions made in the course of business and exclude initial worksite decisions. 
134. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 920-21,479 P.2d at 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. Other 
jurisdictions have adopted this exception. See Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 
N.W.2d 193 (1963); Annotation, Liability of Parent For Injury to Unemancipated 
Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.RATH 1066, 1132-34 
(1981). Where this exception applies, the question in the reproductive hazards arena 
is whether parental choice to work in a hazardous workplace was an exercise of ordi-
nary parental discretion in providing care. If so, no suit will follow. It is difficult to 
predict judicial outcomes, however, as the rule provides many loopholes; for example, 
the parental decision could be considered extraordinary or the decision could be con-
sidered outside the scope of "care," defined in as "food, clothing, housing, medical and 
dental services, and other care." Goller, 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. 
135. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (emphasis in orig-
inal). In the context of maternal tort liability, Santello suggests a similar rule: a preg-
nant woman should be held to the standard of care of a reasonably prudent expectant 
mother conducting herself under similar circumstances, with ordinary community 
knowledge. Santello, supra note 131, at 775. 
136. Here, the intersection of tort law and occupational health law becomes 
critical. Currently, OSHA compels mandatory removal with guaranteed pay rate and 
job retention for workers with dangerous blood levels of certain toxins. 29 C.F.R. 
1910.1025(k) (1990). In mandatory removal schemes, the employee has no decision 
to make; thus, she cannot be held liable. Another option would be voluntary leave 
on the employee's part which must be granted; that is, an employee exposed to 
reproductive hazards could ask for a transfer or removal with rate retention during 
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Allowing a cause of action against a parent to proceed 
under the "reasonableness" standard of Gibson may yield 
unsatisfactory results for the injured offspring, who may be left 
without a remedy. This familiar dilemma once again illustrates 
limitations in our tort system, which relies on a finding of 
fault. To fulfill the goal of compensation for injury, a no-fault 
system of compensation for injury from reproductive hazards 
should be adopted. 137 
2) Consequences of Parental Liability 
Recognizing parental liability for workplace reproductive 
harm has both positive and negative implications. Allowing 
parental liability undercuts an employer's Title VII business 
necessity defense of fetal protection policies. 13B If there is less 
likelihood of employer liability, there is less incentive to dis-
criminate. 139 Furthermore, if parental choice cuts off the 
employer's liability, the employer may have no corresponding 
duty to protect the fetus. 
On the other hand, recognizing parental liability may 
restrict autonomy and privacy.14o Allowing a cause of action 
pregnancy or the conception period, and the employer would be obligated to accom· 
modate her. Under such a voluntary scheme, in a jurisdiction allowing tort suits 
against parents for prenatal or preconception injury, a parent could theoretically be 
liable for a decision not to take a leave in the face of known risks. 
137. See infra pp. 710-713. 
138. However, Johnson Controls has mooted this consideration. As the Court stat· 
ed, "The extra cost of employing members of one sex, however, does not provide an affir· 
mative Title VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender .... 
[Tlhe incremental cost of hiring women cannot justify discriminating against them." 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, III S. Ct. 1196, 1209 (1991). 
139. Where parental responsibility is recognized, the employer can seek indem· 
nity from the parent for any contributory negligence. 
140. Such recognition would bolster the idea that women's autonomy should be 
limited during pregnancy for the welfare of the fetus, see Robertson, infra note 169, at 
437-43, thus lending support to controversial tactics, such as prosecuting women for 
drug or alcohol abuse during pregnancy or incarcerating women to protect fetal health. 
See Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women's Autonomy, 17 HASTINGS CENTER 
REP. 4, 33 (1987). Recognition off eta 1 rights also undercuts women's rights to termi· 
nate a pregnancy, although the abortion decision may be distinguished from other con· 
texts. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional 
Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 611-12 (1986). 
For judicial decisions dealing with the privacy/autonomy aspect ofparentallia· 
bility for negligence resulting in prenatal injuries, see Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 
2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988) (child's cause ofaction for unintentional infliction of 
prenatal injuries denied. 1d. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361. The court considered the effect 
of recognizing a fetal right to be born health and the corresponding duty to provide 
the best possible prenatal environment on women's privacy and autonomy. 1d. at 277-
80,531 N.E.2d at 359-61); Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980) 
(child's cause of action allowed to proceed against a mother who negligently took a drug 
during pregnancy, causing tooth discoloration. 1d. at 402,301 N.W.2d at 871). 
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against parents, most likely women, reinforces the idea that a 
woman's primary function and duty is that of childbearer and 
mother, which devalues women's participation in the market-
place.!4! Moreover, recognizing the cause of action fosters an 
adversarial view of divided interests between women and off-
spring, when in reality, their interests are often congruent.!42 
For these policy reasons, parental immunity from tort lia-
bility for the decision to work in a hazardous workplace could 
be imposed.!43 Carving out an exception for these decisions, 
however, may reinforce the idea that reproduction is "special" 
and untouchable.!« Moreover, a blanket rule relieving women 
from liability, like a blanket rule making certain decisions 
unenforceable,!46 detracts from women's ability to choose, plan 
and decide. !48 
141. Some discriminatory fetal protection policies operate similarly. See Becker, 
supra note 4, at 1231-34. 
142. Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women's Autonomy, 17 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 4, 35-37 (1987). In the reproductive hazards arena, a court might see the 
woman's interest in hazardous work and the fetal interest in health as entirely at odds. 
In reality, however, their interests are congruent in at least one important respect: 
if the woman maintains her job, she maintains income and health care benefits to pro-
vide proper nutrition, shelter and prenatal care to her offspring. 
143. The rule could be modeled after CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6(a) (Deering 1990), which 
states: "No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that 
the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed 
to have been born alive." This statute was enacted in response to Curlender v. Bio-
Science Labs., which implied in dicta that a child could sue his parent for "wrongful life." 
106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829,165 Cal. Rptr. 477,488 (1980). Similar language could be 
used to bar a cause of action by a child against a parent for choosing to work in a 
hazardous workplace. However, the policy bases of the two statutes would be quite 
different. Section 43.6 appears to respond to pro-life concerns that a parent should not 
be encouraged to abort out of fear that the child might sue for failure to do so. A rule 
barring suit for the choice to work would recognize that a parent should not be 
punished for choosing to work out of necessity in the face of hazards. In the 
employment arena, freedom of contract is only an ideal; in reality, workers face 
economic and other coercions, forcing choices that are potentially dangerous to 
offspring. 
144. For a discussion of the equal treatment/special treatment debate among fem-
inist scholars, see, e.g., Krieger & Cooney, supra note 34. See also Shultz, infra note 
145. 
145. In the surrogacy arena, a New Jersey court has held that a surrogate 
mother's contract to give up the baby she had carried for another couple in exchange 
for payment is unenforceable. In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). This 
rule may undercut women's ability to contract, reducing their ability to participate in 
the traditionally male sphere of the marketplace. Shultz, Reproductiue Technology and 
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender-Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 297, 
379-80 (1990). The rule also reinforces stereotypic views of women as unreliable deci-
sion-makers. Id. at 381-84. 
146. Arguably, most workplace reproductive harms are mediated through women, 
although there is considerable controversy on this point. Some feminist commentators 
argue that harm to offspring may occur equally through men and women. See 
Williams, supra note 10, at 655-63. Others suggest that the facts are more complex. 
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The disadvantages of recognizing parental liability thus out-
weigh the advantages, but a statutory bar to liability may be 
undesirable. Case by case determination using a reasonable-
ness standard and considering privacy and autonomy fac-
tors147 can protect parents from unlimited liability. 
3) Constitutional Bars to Tort Suit Against Parent 
Assuming state tort law would allow a child's suit to pro-
ceed against a parent for workplace reproductive injury, the 
parent's constitutional rights to parental autonomy and to 
privacy, grounded in the fourteenth amendment's due process 
clause, could bar such a suit. 148 
a) Parental Autonomy 
Parents have a liberty interest under the due process clause 
in directing the upbringing and education of their children. 149 A 
See, e.g., Birth Defects, supra note 4, at 240 (teratogenic agents, which act directly on an 
embryo after conception, affect only women); Buss, supra note 10, at 579 ("[Slome tox-
ins may pose a greater threat to reproductive health through maternal exposure than 
through paternal exposure. b). Adverse reproductive effects through male exposure to tox-
ins continue to be documented. See Blakeslee, supra note 10 (fathers who work with lead 
have an almost fourfold increased risk of producing children with Wilm's tumor, a kid-
ney cancer); Himmelstein, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: What the Practitioner 
Needs to Know About Chemical Exposures, 71 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 921, 922-24, 
934 (1988) (noting linkage oflead exposed men to pregnancy loss, genetic damage and 
infertility); Cunningham, Chronic Occupational Lead Exposure: The Potential Effect on 
Sexual Function and Reproductive Ability in Male Workers, 34 AAOHN J. 277, 278-79 
(1986) (discussing adverse effects oflead on male reproductive function). 
147. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267,531 N.E.2d 355 (1988). 
148. Though constitutional claims are most often asserted to bar criminal pros-
ecutions, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy pro-
hibits state from criminalizing first trimester abortion), the Constitution may also 
provide a defense to a tort suit. See e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) (first amendment right to freedom of the press precludes a tort suit for defama-
tion under certain circumstances); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) 
(first and fourteenth amendments bar suit for intentional infliction of emotional 
harm). State statutory or common law must first recognize the tort before a consti-
tutional claim can be raised. 
149. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). Pierce and two other 
cases provide the impetus for the following textual discussion. In Pierce, the Court 
invalidated an Oregon statute requiring parents to send their children to public 
schools.Id. at 536. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court upheld 
a statute prohibiting parents from allowing their children to sell merchandise on the 
streets. Id. at 171. The statute was challenged as a violation of first amendment rights 
of Jehovah's Witnesses to freely practice religion. Id. at 167. Finally, in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that the first amendment's right to free exer-
cise of religion and the fourteenth amendment's right to parental control of children 
prohibited a state from compelling Amish parents to send their children to formal high 
school until age sixteen. Id. at 234. The holdings in Prince and Yoder were recently 
reaffirmed in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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child is not merely a "creature of the state"l60 since there is a 
private realm of family life which the state may not enter.161 
However, there are limits to parental autonomy interests,162 for 
the Government has an interest in and duty to protect chil-
dren. 163 Society depends on healthy young people; thus, a par-
ent is not free to expose a child to communicable disease, ill 
health or death. 164 
Limitations on parental liberty interests focus on those 
decisions which could affect the child's health or burden soci-
ety.166 Both factors are implicated in the reproductive haz-
ards arena. A parent's choice to work in a hazardous workplace 
could jeopardize the health of future offspring. 166 Caring for chil-
dren injured by toxic exposure imposes significant social bur-
dens. Even with an adequate system of compensation, either 
tort or no-fault, society pays through higher product cost. 
Since the potential harm to the child's health and costs to 
society may outweigh parental liberty interests, a due process 
parental autonomy claim should not bar a tort suit by an 
injured child against a parent. This conclusion is supported by 
California case law upholding medical treatment of children 
over the religious objections of parents.167 
150. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
151. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
152. Id.; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972). 
153. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
154. Id. at 166-168. 
155. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972). The Court has noted that 
where parental interest is purely secular, such as in the interest in working or in a 
particular job, that interest would be less weighty than a religious interest when bal-
anced against the state's interests. See id. at 215-16; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 165 (1944). See also cases discussed infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
156. There is no absolute constitutional right to work in a particular job. See L. 
TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-13, at 1375-78 (2d ed. 1988), and cases cited 
therein. In some cases there is a limited right to practice one's profession, arising out 
of rights to economic liberty and personhood. Id. That may not be implicated in the 
hazardous workplace area, where the jobs are usually blue-collar production or man-
ufacturing jobs. 
157. Through criminal prosecutions or civil dependency hearings, states may 
intervene to protect the welfare of children. In In re Philip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 
156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), parental refusal to allow heart surgery was upheld under the 
due process right of parental autonomy. Id. at 801,156 Cal. Rptr. at 50. The state's 
dependency petition was dismissed because the state failed to justify intervention 
where surgery presented a substantial risk of further harm to the child. Id. at 801-
803, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50-52. However, four years later, the court affirmed an order 
of change of guardianship and authorized a heart catheterization. Guardianship of 
Philip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 430,188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 796 (1983). In another case 
involving a child affiicted with eye cancer, the court affirmed an adjudication declaring 
him a dependent ward of the court to ensure periodic medical review. In re 
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b) Privacy 
A second constitutional defense to a tort suit brought by a 
child against the parent could be based on the right to priva-
cy.158 This'l"ight prohibits state intervention in an adult deci-
sion to use contraceptivesl59 or to abort a pre-viable fetus. 16o The 
right to privacy encompasses notions of bodily integrity l61 and 
the right to control one's destiny.162 Freedom from bodily intru-
sion is an important element of this liberty.163 
Although the scope of procreative liberty delineated by 
privacy case law includes the right to use contraceptives and 
to abortion, the right to prevent life does not determine what 
prenatal and preconception regulation is permissible. An 
unlimited right to knowingly expose her fetus to workplace tox-
ins does not necessarily follow from a woman's right to termi-
nate a pregnancy. Should she choose to carry her child to 
term, the child may suffer injury as a consequence of toxic 
Eric B., 189 Cal. App. 3d 996,1009, 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 29 (1987). The court noted a "sub-
stantiallikelihood of harm" would justify intervention; the state could legitimately act 
to prevent the possibility of harm. Id. at 1002-04, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 24-26. Finally, 
in Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112,763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), the 
court allowed criminal prosecution of a parent for involuntary manslaughter and felony 
child endangerment. The parent had refused medical treatment of her child's menin-
gitis because of religious beliefs. Id. at 119, 763 P.2d at 854, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4. The 
court noted that even religious liberties must yield when a child's health is endangered. 
Id. at 133, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15. 
158. This right to privacy is embodied in the first, fourth, ninth, and fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
159. Id.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 
431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
160. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 
492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
161. L. TRIBE, supra note 112, §§ 15-9 to 15-10, at 1329-62. 
162. L. TRIBE, supra note 112, § 15-10, at 1352 (the decision to abort implicates 
autonomy and control of one's reproductive destiny); Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989) (laws restricting abortion implicate the right to priva-
cy because they dictate the course of a person's life). 
163. The principle of bodily autonomy was first acknowledged in Union Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), where the Court refused to compel a personal 
injury plaintiiTto submit to a physical examination. However, courts have allowed sig-
nificant bodily intrusions over women's objections in order to protect fetal health, e.g., 
court-ordered caesarians were upheld in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. 
Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) and in In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 539 A.2d 203 
(D.C. 1987), vacated and remanded, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). Similarly, blood trans-
fusions have been ordered over women's religious objections. See generally Kolder, 
Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Intervention, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1192, 1193 (1987); Nelson & Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant 
Women: Life, Liberty and Law in Conflict, 259 J. AM. MED. A. 1060 (1988). 
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exposure. 164 In this context, the right to be born healthy is 
implicated. 166 
However, arguing that an injured child should be compen-
sated is not advocating a right to be born healthy. There is a 
crucial distinction between compensation and deterrence: 
compensatory damages co'mpensate for injury already incurred, 
whereas deterrence focuses on regulating behavior and avoid-
ing potential harm.166 Requiring payment of damages, which 
may change future behavior, is not equivalent to restricting cur-
rent behavior.167 
This distinction forms the crux of the argument against crim-
inal sanctions for behavior during pregnancy/66 for such sanctions 
are a direct intrusion on bodily integrity while compensatory dam-
ages are not. Some commentators suggest that once a woman 
foregoes abortion and chooses to carry her child to term, she sub-
jects herself to legal limitations imposed to protect fetal health. 169 
Nevertheless, a choice to continue pregnancy does not waive all 
fundamental rights to bodily integrity and autonomy.170 
164. Courts and commentators alike recognize that different considerations 
outside the realm of abortion come into play with a child's birth. In Turpin v. Sortini, 
31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1982), the court noted this funda-
mental difference in a wrongful life claim that the child would have been better off not 
being born. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. Comparing non-exis-
tence and impaired existence is difficult ifnot impossible. Id. at 229-39, 643 P.2d at 
959-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342-49. See also Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: 
Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 
95 YALE L.J. 599, 612 (1986) (arguing that recognizing fetal rights yields two distinct 
consequences: in proscribing abortion, the state imposes a duty to bear unwanted chil-
dren, but in the non-abortion context, the state compels women who choose to bear chil-
dren to conform to judicially defined norms of behavior). 
165. Courts have invoked the child's "legal right to begin life with a sound mind 
and body." In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 115,293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980) (citing 
Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725,187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971». 
166. An analogous distinction is found in first amendment law: prior restraint, 
the more intrusive approach, is rarely allowed, whereas after-the-fact fines and 
penalties are more readily tolerated. See also Hazard, Rectification of Client Fraud: 
Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271 (1984) (discussing the 
distinction between prevention and rectification) ("Preventive action by definition 
shapes the future ... whereas rectification deals with the past and mitigates but 
does not undo the course of events." Id. at 291). 
167. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text discussing preemption 
cases. 
168. Such sanctions include prosecution for drug abuse, incarceration to prevent 
drug usage, or forced surgical procedures. See Developments in the Law: Medical 
Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1556-82 (1990). 
169. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, 
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437-43 (1983) (suggesting state sanc-
tions for knowing exposure to teratogenic substances or workplaces that could harm 
fetal health). 
170. There are many reasons for carrying a pregnancy to term, including finan-
cial, social, religious and family pressures. 
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Thus, protecting the interests of potential offspring against 
the parent's own liberty interests poses a dilemma, for the only 
way to prevent all harm is to severely restrict parental liberty 
and choice.l7l Nevertheless, reasonable regulation of worker/ 
parent behavior to protect offspring172 can coexist with consti-
tutionally protected procreative liberty. 173 
III. PROVIDING COMPENSATION - A PROPOSAL 
Currently, in California, a child injured through parental 
exposure to workplace reproductive hazards has no remedy out-
side a parental tort suit. Although this dilemma could be part-
ly alleviated by legislation allowing suit against a negligent 
employer,174 there are numerous obstacles to recovery.175 A no-fault 
system of compensation could provide a guaranteed remedy.176 
A no-fault system would be ideal, not only because 
employers may be unable to eliminate all toxins from certain 
workplaces, but because it serves the four compensation 
171. The question of tolerable level of risk is again implicated: in order to 
accommodate parental liberty, some risk is inevitable. However, in lieu of the par-
ent bearing the entire cost through severely restricted choice or tort liability, increased 
workplace safety and compensation costs should be spread over society as a whole 
through higher product cost. 
172. The abortion context is distinguished, as there is no third party involvement 
with a pre-viable fetus. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973). 
173. It is difficult to properly balance the corresponding interests of parent and 
fetus. Indisputably, bodily integrity is fundamentally protected; thus, it seems very 
intrusive to restrict adult liberty to protect sex cells from harm. However, when a 
woman is pregnant, there are two interests at stake. The desire to protect the fetal 
interest by restricting exposure to toxic workplaces seems less troublesome. But this 
restriction would apply only to women and the differential treatment is discrimina-
tory. Perhaps this conflict can be solved by accommodating reproductive functions 
through paid leaves from toxic workplaces. See supra pp. 679-681. 
174. This legislation must abrbgate Bell v. Macy's California, 212 Cal. App. 3d 
1442,261 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1989). See supra pp. 685-689. 
175. See supra pp. 689-701. 
176. Two model no-fault systems are the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l to 300aa-34 (1991) and the Virginia Birth-Related 
Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to 38.2-5021 
(1990 & Supp. 1991). Both Acts are described in detail in S. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY 
WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAw: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, 
AND BUSINESS 106-10 (1989). The summaries that follow are based on Prof. Sugarman's 
descriptions. 
The Vaccine Program was enacted to compensate the small percentage of children 
who suffer from documented side-effects of mandatory vaccines, such as anti-pertussis. 
Compensation is paid on a showing that the victim was vaccinated and then suffered 
one of the statutorily recognized side-effects. Compensation includes otherwise uncov-
ered medical expenses, incidental expenses, lost earnings (set at state average wage), 
and pain and suffering damages up to $250,000. This is an elective scheme, funded 
by an excise tax of a few dollars per vaccine dose. 
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policy goals. The system could provide guaranteed compen-
sation for injured offspring. It could remove incentives for 
discrimination since all employees could be covered under the 
same premium cost. As a no-fault system need not bar tort 
suits for egregious employer behavior, there are clean-up 
incentives to reduce injury and keep premium cost low. 
Finally, the system is fair to employers: it avoids litigation 
cost and delay, and eliminates punitive damages absent bla-
tant wrongdoing. 
A no-fault system of compensation177 should require a show-
ing of parental exposure to a known reproductive hazard and 
a resulting injury linked to that hazard. 17s The plan should pro-
vide medical and incidental expenses, as well as lost earnings; 
optimally, pain and suffering damages should be allowed. A no-
fault system could be funded publicly through an employer tax 
or privately through commercial insurance companies; in 
either case, employers would pay a specified dollar amount for 
each potentially exposed employee. Although employers should 
be required to participate in the plan,179 employees could elect 
plan benefits, i.e., guaranteed compensation. ISO Hence, tort 
suits against the employer would be precluded, except where 
there was gross negligence or intentional injury. lSI 
A no-fault system of compensation in the reproductive haz-
ards area is not without problems. First, the causal link 
The Virginia Act compensates eligible children who were neurologically injured 
during delivery. No showing of negligence is required. The plan pays reasonable com· 
pensation for net economic loss, and is funded by hospital and physician assess-
ments. It is the exclusive remedy for patients of participating physicians. Ifa physician 
does not elect to participate in the plan, then patients can sue in tort. 
177. The following system applicable to workplace reproductive injury is drawn 
from the elements of the two model Acts. See supra note 176. 
178. Injuries linked to reproductive hazards should be statutorily described, as 
are recognized side·effects in the Vaccine Act. See National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program, supra note 176. 
179 Participation should be mandatory for employers to ensure one form of 
compensation. 
180. Since tort recovery is generally uncertain, the prospect of guaranteed com· 
pensation enhances participation in a no-fault system. See S. SUGARMAN, supra note 
176, at 108. Nevertheless, employee election discriminates against children whose par-
ents opt out of the plan and lose guaranteed compensation. Another problem with elec-
tivity concerns employer coercion to opt out of the plan. 
181. The threat of substantial liability for egregious conduct provides an incen-
tive for workplace safety. Here, the system differs from workers' compensation, where 
possible tort recovery is forfeited for guaranteed remedy. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
38, at 574. In the reproductive hazards area, tort compensation should be retained, not 
only to provide clean-up incentives, but because the injured offspring did not forfeit any-
thing (at the time the injury occurred) in exchange for no-fault benefits. 
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between a parent's exposure to a workplace hazard and a 
child's injury may be tenuous and difficult to prove.182 However, 
this problem could be resolved by establishing a rebuttable pre-
sumption that an injury resulted from exposure to a workplace 
toxin; then, the burden would shift to the employer to prove 
that exposure did not cause the injury.l83 
Second, it may seem unfair to compensate children injured 
through workplace reproductive hazards while other children 
with birth defects are left without a remedy. 1M Indeed, social-
ized health insurance, whereby health care is accessible at a 
reasonable cost, would be ideal. However, until such a system 
is adopted, a no-fault scheme aimed particularly at the work-
place hazards problem is the best temporary solution.185 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, California law provides no acceptable remedy for 
a child injured through parental exposure to workplace repro-
182. Any number of toxins may cause any number or type of birth defects; prov-
ing causation could be extremely difficult. See Birth Defects, supra note 4, at 256, n.97 
(general environmental factors can produce birth defects similar to those caused by 
workplace hazards). In contrast, the side-effects caused by anti-pertussis vaccine are 
well-established, S. SUGARMAN, supra note 176, at 107, and it is fairly easy to ascer-
tain the connection between delivery complications and resulting brain damage. 
Difficulties in proving causation may be the reason no suit against an employer has 
ever resulted in recovery for the child. See, e.g., Security Nat'l Bank v. Chloride, Inc., 
602 F. Supp. 294, 295 (Kan. 1985) (damages denied for injuries allegedly suffered from 
lead exposure in the workplace). But see settlement in Stelly v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 20 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1040 (Nov. 21, 1990). 
183. Although this may be a difficult burden of proof to meet, it is justified: the 
employer usually possesses superior information, plus there is an added incentive to 
fund further research into toxic exposure. Moreover, the employer's insurance com-
pany would be paying the benefits-any risk of higher premiums is outweighed by 
avoiding huge settlements. Practically speaking, if more claims are awarded than the 
system can support, the legislature could narrow the types of covered injuries. 
184. As Sugarman points out, "There are, after all, enormous numbers of chil-
dren, who are born with birth defects or contract serious diseases, and who ... are as 
deserving as vaccine-damaged children. But there is little prospect of reaching their 
compensation needs through plans that depend on identifying enterprises that have 
somehow caused their condition .... [M]any disabled children will simply have no 
access to either tort recovery or a special compensation fund. What is required 
instead are new ways of thinking about disabled children in general." S. SUGARMAN, 
supra note 176, at 108-09. 
185. Discrimination in favor of children injured through workplace reproductive 
hazards over other children with birth defects is acceptable at this point in time for two 
reasons. First, compensating these children is a step toward "new ways of thinking about 
disabled children in general." [d. It is a step toward society's recogr)ition and compen-
sation of those children who bear the risk. Many defects are caused by substances use-
ful to society; where injury occurs, society should bear the cost of compensation. Second, 
a no-fault plan, as an extension of an employee benefit plan, can be part of the com-
prehensive compensation system Professor Sugarman proposes. [d. at 125-65. 
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ductive hazards. Given California's recognition of prenatal and 
preconception causes of action, however, the question is not 
whether such injury should be redressed, but who should 
redress it. Employees, who create the risk of injury and 
arguably benefit the most from it, should bear the bulk of the 
cost of compensation through a system coupling tort recovery 
with a no-fault remedy. Such a system can be consistent with 
procreative liberty, while encompassing the four policy prin-
ciples of compensation for injury, non-discrimination, incentives 
for workplace safety, and fairness to employers. 
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